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INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTNE 
WASTES 
Eugene Nathanson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The accumulation of radioactive wastes associated with the ex-
panded production of nuclear energy is not a problem that is limited 
to the United States. For one thing, nuclear technology is expanding 
throughout the world. Furthermore, radioactive wastes are not 
solely the concern of the country in which they are produced. Since 
the problem is international in scope, radioactive wastes can appar-
ently best be controlled by a cooperative approach among nations. 
Although some movement toward cooperation has begun, the broad 
multi-lateral attack that seems practical and non-controversial has 
not developed. The reason for this failure may be a general lack of 
goodwill among nations or a general nonrecognition that manage-
ment of radioactive wastes can be separated from those aspects of 
nuclear physics where strategic needs dictate a cautious self-serving 
approach to international relations. 
This article will briefly review the problem of radioactive wastes. 
It will then discuss the degree of international cooperation now ex-
isting in dealing with these wastes, and the possibility that world 
bodies may take over full responsibility for waste management. 
I. THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROBLEM 
A. Wastes Associated with Nuclear Energy Production 
Radioactive wastes are classified by their concentration of 
radioactivity as low-, intermediate-, or high-level. Low-level wastes 
have a concentration up to about one thousand times that consid-
ered safe for immediate release. Intermediate-level wastes have a 
concentration about one hundred to one thousand times greater 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
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than low-level waste, with high-level wastes up to several billions 
times greater.! Since radioactive wastes can not be made harmless 
through chemical or physical treatment,2 they remain active until 
natural decay of the atoms takes place. The rate of decay is mea-
sured by the isotope's half-life-the time it will take for one half of 
the atoms in a sample of the element to decay. As a "rule of thumb," 
radioactive material should be segregated from the environment for 
about twenty half-lives.3 
In view of the intractability of radioactive wastes, the options for 
dealing with them are limited. Wastes of low radioactive content 
can be diluted sufficiently so that they can be safely released di-
rectly into the environment, or they can be concentrated so that the 
non-radioactive material can be discharged and the remainder, a 
much smaller amount by volume, stored until decay renders it 
harmless.4 Sufficient dilution for discharge of high-level wastes is 
impossible.s 
Wastes of various radioactive content and a wide range of half-
lives are produced at different stages in the nuclear fuel cycle. Natu-
rally occuring radioactive ores removed from their former isolated 
burial site are exposed at mines in the form of mill tailings, which 
contain very small concentrations of radioactivity. They do, how-
ever, contain Radium-226, which has a sufficiently long half-life 
(1,620 years) to necessitate some assurance that these materials will 
not be used as landfills or structural materials associated with 
human occupancy for a period of several thousand years.8 
Gaseous and liquid low-level wastes are produced during fuel pro-
cessing and energy generation and routinely discharged with little 
treatment.7 If the half-life of the radioactive elements they contain 
is short enough, they can be held for short periods of time, allowing 
for sufficient decay to render them harmless. Subsequently the 
wastes are discharged into the air or water, where hopefully those 
portions still active are quickly diluted. 
I Fox, RADIOACTIVE WASTES 11-12, U.S.A.E.C. (rev. ed. 1969). 
2 [d. at 4. 
3 P. EHRUCH, THE END OF AFFLUENCE 292 (1974). 
• Van De Voorde, Revues des Techniques de Traitment, in DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE: 
PRoCEEDINGS OF THE INFORMATION MEETING ORGANIZED BY NEA, 31 (Paris 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as NEA INFORMATION MEETING]. 
• A concentration of plutonium-239 "no larger than an orange," if dispersed throughout the 
environment, could threaten human survival. R. HALLMAN, TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY 
SOUND LAw OF THE SEA, 7, (International Institute for Environment and Development 1974). 
• Lenneman, Parker and West, Management of Radioactive Wastes, IAEA BULL. vol. 17, 
no. 4, at 2 (August 1975) [hereinafter cited as Lenneman]. 
7 Fox, supra note 1, at 11. 
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The major problem area is the disposal of high-level wastes. When 
fuel which has been in use at a reactor for some time is treated at 
fuel reprocessing plants, uranium-235 and plutonium are separated 
from the accumulated waste products with half-lives as high as 
25,000 years. While separating these elements with long radioactive 
lives from the remaining waste might be technically feasible, such 
a procedure would probably not produce benefits worth the cost.S 
For the moment, these wastes are being held in temporary storage 
until safe permanent disposal sites can be engineered or discovered.s 
The temporary storage sites require the expense of constant surveil-
lance and maintenance. Such sites have also had control failures 
which fortunately have not yet produced any disastrous conse-
quences. to Proper disposal of these wastes involves isolation from the 
environment for up to several hundred thousand years. Retrievabil-
ity is also an important consideration so that the waste can be 
recovered in the event of unforeseen emergencies, such as geological 
change. The possibilities for such disposal include engineered facili-
ties or natural geological formations or some combination of the two. 
Salt, granite, shale and clay formations, which have remained dry 
and stable for millions or hundreds of millions of years, may be 
likely depositaries,u Each potential location should, of course, be 
individually and carefully studied. No absolute guarantee exists 
that a geological site would permanently isolate the waste; if "tem-
porary" storage is continued permanently with continuous surveil-
lance, no absolute guarantee of perfect human monitoring exists 
either. The only certainty with a hazard of this magnitude is that 
expense considerations should not be allowed to outweigh safety 
considerations. 
The final waste problem associated with any nuclear plant, which 
has not until recently received sufficiently serious consideration, is 
the decommissioning of an obsolete plant. '2 During operation, struc-
tural materials and equipment become activated through the ab-
sorption of neutrons from the radioactive fuel. '3 These activation 
products must be as surely isolated from the biosphere as other 
• Lenneman, supra note 6, at 8. 
• Fox, supra note 1, at 29. 
10 PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN PROGRAMS FOR MANAGING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACfIVE WASTE 22, 
31 (U.S. Gen. Acct. Office 1971). 
" The only "credible" pathway to the biosphere is through water transport. Lenneman, 
supra note 6, at 9. 
12 [d. at 6. 
13 [d. 
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radioactive wastes. Three courses of decommissioning are possible: 
(1) abandoning the plant and totally restricting entry to the area; 
(2) attempting to convert the plant to other uses while restricting 
entry; and (3) removing all of the irradiated structures. 14 The first 
would dot the landscape with radioactive monuments. The second 
solution requires finding a practical alternative use of the facility. 
The cost of the third solution is estimated to equal or exceed the 
original facility cost. Alternatively, if decommissioning is to be con-
sidered at the time of construction, construction and operation de-
sign features will have to be changed at some expense. 15 Hopefully, 
as more attention is devoted to the decommissioning problem, more 
attractive solutions will be discovered. 
B. World- Wide Expansion of Nuclear Power Generation 
The magnitude of the radioactive waste problem is directly re-
lated to the amount of waste produced, and world energy demands 
are resulting in a great increase in the number of nuclear generating 
plants and a concomitant increase in the quantity of wastes pro-
duced. As of the end of 1974, 149 power reactors were operating in 
19 countries, with plans for reactors on the drawing boards in 23 
additional countries and a projected seven-fold increase in generat-
ing capacity by 1985.18 The growth is not limited to oil importing 
countries. Iran, for instance, with four power reactors under con-
struction, is planning the purchase of $700 million of uranium from 
South Mrica,17 and "sees better and more economic ways of using 
its oil than burning it to make steam for a generator."IS 
Unless rising expectations and pressing needs in the developing 
countries and the energy demands of the developed countries can 
be met by a more environmentally sound source, worldwide use of 
nuclear reactors will in the future meet an increasingly large percen-
tage of world energy needs. Although growing pressure to slow or 
halt reactor production in the United States and other developed 
nations has occurred, divergent national goals and international 
differences render doubtful the possibility that all or most nations 
will agree or can be compelled to agree to halt the spread of nuclear 
1·1d. 
'·1d . 
.. u.s. NEWS AND WORW REPORT Sept. 30, 1974, at 51. 
17 Boston Globe, Oct. 12, 1975, at 15. 
I. Paul Turner, Vice-president of the Atomic Industrial Forum, quoted in U.S. NEWS, supra 
note 16, at 51. 
1976] RADIOACTIVE WASTES 367 
energy.19 Equally unlikely is the probability that nuclear exporting 
countries will restrict their sales to the have-not nations. Economic 
competition is a significant factor in the sale of reactors by nuclear 
exporters, and American industry spokesmen expect that any slack 
created from restrictions on United States exports will be quickly 
taken up by other nations. 20 The revenues from exports are substan-
tial and very important for some companies. 21 Reduced United 
States sales due to environmental opposition greatly increase pres-
sure to develop the export market. 22 
The radioactive waste which has been and will be produced by 
this increased number of nuclear reactors is a problem of concern 
to the nations of the world, individually and as a group. "The exten-
sive applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes transcend 
national boundaries and, as a minimum, they call for common in-
ternational rules."23 Among the low-level wastes, tritium, krypton-
85, and iodine-129 are of particular worldwide concern.24 The global 
concentrations of tritium and krypton-85 will probably approach 
unacceptable limits during the first half of the twenty-first cen-
tury.25 
Also of general concern is the discharge of waste into common 
waterways. When several nuclear plants discharge wastes into a 
single river, a central authority would clearly be helpful in co-
ordinating and controlling the individual discharges so that other-
wise harmless quantities do not accumulate, poisoning a water sup-
ply.26 Any radioactive deposit into the sea, the world's major com-
mon waterway, is of concern to the entire human community, par-
ticularly since these radioactive substances can be dispersed over 
vast areas by biological mechanisms.27 Furthermore, some elements, 
" Zellers, Saunders and Angino, Discussion, 29 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCI. 2, 54 (Apri11973). 
20 New York Times, August 20, 1975, at 74, col. 4. 
21 Reactor exports provided 12% of Westinghouse's 1974 revenues, and, it is estimated, $25-
million pretax income out of a total net income of $28 million. New York Times, August 17, 
1975, at 36, col. 5. 
22 Id. at col. 4. 
23 Dr. Sigvard Eklund, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
quoted in Foreword, in NUCLEAR LAW FOR A DEVELOPING WORW, LECTURES GIVEN AT THE 
TRAINING COURSE ON THE LEGAL AsPECTS OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY (IAEA Vienna 
1969) [hereinafter cited as IAEA TRAINING COURSE]. 
" Sousselier, Situation Actuelle Et Previsions Pour L'Avenir Des Problems Poses Par Les 
Dechets Radioactifs, in NEA INFORMATION MEETING, supra note 4, at 210, 212. 
2. Lenneman, supra note 6, at 7. 
" See Browder and Parsons, Control of Radioactive Waste Disposal, in IAEA TRAINING 
COURSE, supra note 23, at 232. 
27 For example, radioactivity from the Bikini Island hydrogen bomb tests was broadly 
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if discharged into coastal waters, may reconcentrate on suspended 
matter and be deposited on beaches.28 Tides and currents may dis-
perse material and allow radioactive substances to "turn up to de-
stroy the health and life of species half a world away."29 The sea 
suffers from the further danger of its misleading appearance as a 
limitless sump, capable of absorbing all the planet's garbage. A 
state can, with little moral anguish, distribute to the world at large 
the harmful consequences of its production of radioactive wastes 
rather than concentrating the problem in its own territory.30 
The most critical problem for the world at large as well as for the 
producing State is the storage or disposal of high-level, long lasting 
waste. Since this waste is so lethal, and may last for so long, an 
accidental discharge at one nation's storage or disposal area could 
appear on another nation's territory while still dangerously radioac-
tive. Any State can reasonably be concerned over the security at 
another State's waste disposal site. In addition, if permanent geo-
logical disposal sites become practicable, they will not necessarily 
match up with the national boundaries of the waste producers,31 a 
situation which raises an area of possible future conflict. Finally, 
over the hundreds of thousands of years that this waste will remain 
a hazard, present national boundaries and national considerations 
will lose their meaning. A problem which will persist for that long, 
even if effectively isolated in a small area, is necessarily a world 
concern. 
II. PRESENT SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
A. International Organizations 
The need for common principles of radiation protection has re-
sulted in a unique situation where international rather than local 
action has been in the forefront of setting bases for regulation. 32 In 
dispersed by fish following ocean currents, Feldt, Behavior of Radioactivity in the Marine 
Environment, NEA INFORMATION MEETING, supra note 4, at 69, 71. 
28 Morley, Critical Pathways and Derived Working Limits, in NEA INFORMATION MEETING, 
supra note 4, at 92, 96. 
" HALLMAN, supra note 5, at 6-7. 
3. Goldie, A General View of International Environmental Law, A Survey of Capabilities, 
Trends and Limitations, in COLLOQUIUM, 1973: THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (Academie de Droit IntemationalI975). 
31 Rose and Kubo, Nuclear Waste Disposal in the Oceans, 185 SCIENCE 1183, 1184 (Sept. 
27, 1974). 
32 International Co-operation in the Field of Radioactive Transfrontier Pollution, 14 
NUCLEAR LAW BULL. 55, 56 (1974). 
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1928, the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(ICRP) was established by the International Congress of Radiology 
to set standards for radiation exposure in the medical field. In 1950, 
the ICRP was reorganized to deal with more widespread uses of 
radioactive elements. As a non-political group made up of 13 "inter-
nationally recognized experts" from various countries in various 
scientific fields, its exposure recommendations are well received and 
serve as the touchstone for most national and international regula-
tion. 33 
The world organ in the area of nuclear energy is the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1956 under the aegis 
of the United Nations. It consists of over 100 member States, and, 
except for the People's Republic of China, includes all the States 
making use of nuclear power. The objective of the IAEA is to pro-
mote the use of atomic energy for "peace, health and prosperity 
throughout the world," with particular attention to preventing the 
use of nuclear energy for military purposes.34 The Statute of the 
IAEA gives it the authority to set "standards of safety for protection 
of health and minimization of danger to life and property," and to 
apply these standards in three areas of activity: (1) IAEA opera-
tions; (2) operations carried out with IAEA support; and (3) opera-
tions under multi-lateral or bi-Iateral treaties or individual State 
activities, at the request of the parties involved.35 The promulgation 
of safety standards has been called "one of the most significant and 
useful activities of the Agency."38 These standards, based on ICRP 
recommendations, involve the establishment of maximum permissi-
ble radiation doses for humans and procedures for specific technical 
operations. 
The conditions for application of health and safety standards are 
set forth in the IAEA Health and Safety DocumentY The aim pre-
sented is not to protect the world community but to "render valua-
ble assistance and useful support to its members." Thus, great lati-
tude is given to a State to apply its own standards if they are 
determined adequate. 3s The State is required to submit to the IAEA 
a statement of the type and amount of radioactive material released 
to the environment, the type and amount disposed of as waste, and 
33 NUCLEAR POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 72 (lAEA 1973). 
34 Statute of the IAEA, 8 UST 1094, TIAS 3873, Art. II (1956). 
35 [d., Art. 1II(6). 
" P. SZASZ, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE IAEA 668 (Vienna 1970). 
37 IAEA INFCmC/18. 
3M [d. para. 12. 
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the method of disposal.39 If the operation involves more than a pre-
scribed minimum of radioactive materials, the IAEA may require 
submission of "all facts necessary to evaluate the potential radia-
tion hazard," including the details of the waste disposal operation.40 
If this minimum is surpassed, the Agency may carry out inspec-
tions,41 and the IAEA may require any other method to ensure ob-
servance of safety standards.42 
The Health and Safety Document is incorporated into aid agree-
ments with Member States in accordance with the Guiding Princi-
ples and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Tech-
nical Assistance by the IAEA.43 Under the Statute of the IAEA, the 
granting of assistance may be made conditional on the adequacy of 
proposed health and safety standards.44 As of 1972, agreements re-
quiring the application of IAEA safety standards were in effect with 
17 countries.45 While the Statute allows the IAEA to apply IAEA 
safety standards, the Health and Safety Document limits the 
IAEA's activity to supervising the State's application of its own 
standards. Even within this limited scope of activity the IAEA has 
not exerted its full authority. The staff of inspectors provided for 
under Article XII(b) and (c) of the Statute was never fully estab-
lished,46 and in the early 1960's inspection operations were discon-
tinued altogetherY Health and safety controls, although originally 
thought to be "self-evident and non-controversial," now are consid-
ered by some to be not only as serious an intrusion on sovereign 
rights as safeguards against diversion of radioactive material to mil-
itary purposes, but also far more costly, and logically chargeable 
only to the operators of the project, a financial burden the operator 
might not wish to bear.48 Such an "intrusion on sovereign rights," 
however, should cause no objection by a good faith participant in 
the IAEA. Short of prohibiting reactor construction, any required 
safety measures operate to the benefit of the nuclear operator since 
harmful effects from radioactive discharges will immediately dam-
31 [d. para. 25(b) . 
•• [d. para. 29(a), (b). 
" [d. para. 31. 
.. [d. para. 30. 
13 IAEA GC(IV)/RES/65, Annex. 
II Statute of the lAEA, 8 UST 1094, TIAS 3873, Art. XI(3) (1956) . 
.. Ha Vinh Phuong, [AEA Safety Standards, their legal status and implementation, in 
EXPERIENCE AND TRENDS IN NUCLEAR LAW 3, 6, lAEA LEGAL SERIES No.8, STI/PUB/333 (1972). 
II SZASZ, supra note 36, at 695. 
17 [d. at 696 . 
•• [d. at 685. 
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age the local area before a possible spread will distribute the harm 
to the world at large. Each nation will benefit by operating its nu-
clear installations with strict practical safety precautions. IAEA 
controls would act primarily to assist a nation concerned with such 
safety by alerting it to possible harmful effects, and voluntary com-
pliance with such controls would not disturb the affected nation's 
sovereignty. 
A nation's unwillingness to pay for safety measures is a much 
more troublesome problem. Pollution from industrial installations 
is not the result of a malevolent scheme on the part of the polluter 
to infect the environment. Where knowledge of the harmful effect 
exists, the impediment to correction is the expense of corrective 
measures. The analysis of cost, harm to be guarded against, and 
beneficial result of the expense will vary depending on the particular 
circumstances of the nation involved: "the attitude in a developing 
country avid for power to raise its living standard may be very 
different from the country fairly satisfied with its standard of living 
but anxious to preserve the environment for enjoyment."49 Any ex-
penses related to increased safety measures will immediately de-
crease any economic benefit obtained by the conversion of a nation's 
energy production to nuclear power. Further, the mandating of 
safety measures by an outside agency may result in an ineffective 
implementation by a nation operating under a different set of val-
ues, not greatly increasing the degree of safety.50 
In the less sensitive areas of technical cooperation and assistance, 
and the sharing of information, the IAEA has been the effective 
device behind a broad range of international collaboration. From 
1957 through August 1974 the IAEA had published some 51 reports 
on waste management alone, as well as sponsoring or co-sponsoring 
56 informational meetings and seminars on both technical and legal 
matters.51 In its programs of direct assistance to individual States, 
members of the IAEA Legal Division have been assigned to various 
countries to assist in drafting nuclear regulatory legislation. 52 
In providing technical assistance through its activities in helping 
to establish the power program in a country rather than through 
mandating controls, the IAEA has a great opportunity to see that a 
.. Kenny, Administrative and Legal Control of the Release of Wastes, in NEA INFORMATION 
MEETING, supra note 4, at 183. 
5. SZASZ, supra note 36 at 689. 
51 The Agency's Programme for 1975-80 and Budget for 1975 at j.14, IAEA GC(XVIII/526 
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Programme]. 
52 IAEA Activities, 13 NUCLEAR LAW BULL. 29 (1974). 
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nation maintains a reasonable level of safety controls. Programs 
now in progress for the establishment of nuclear power in ten devel-
oping nations include provisions for waste management. 53 Once 
again, however, to the extent that charges are assessed to the nu-
clear operator and the IAEA does not itself maintain the waste 
disposal program, the effectiveness of safety controls will depend 
upon the particular values of the individual nuclear operator and 
not upon the common good of the planet. 
B. Regional Organizations 
Western Europe presents a clear model for international concern 
over the possible harmful effects of nuclear energy. With many na-
tions using nuclear energy, sharing relatively close borders and in-
ternational waterways, this group of nations has recognized that 
many problems are associated with reactors, particularly the man-
agement of radioactive wastes, which will not be solved except 
through common effort.54 Two organizations have developed in this 
context: the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)55 and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom). 
The function of the NEA is informational and coordinating; it 
does not mandate practices on the part of its members. It has pub-
lished various technical guides, safety standards and recommenda-
tions, and held scientific and legal meetings, often in conjunction 
with the IAEA. Its special place in the area of waste management 
has arisen under its mandate to promote cooperation and harmoni-
zation of local activities, and particularly the formation of joint 
undertakings. 56 The members of NEA have collaborated, over the 
period from 1967 to 1972, on a series of ocean radioactive waste 
disposal operations, the only multi-lateral operations of this sort. 
These disposals are illustrative of an effective division of responsi-
bilitity between the local government and the international body. 
As the entire series was carried out in a substantially similar man-
ner, a description of the first disposal will serve for the entire set. 57 
The entire plan was generated by an international group of ex-
53 Programme, supra note 51, at c.5. 
54 EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, 13TH ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1971). 
" Formerly the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), this organization was reconsti-
tuted as NEA in 1972 with the admission of Japan and Australia as full members, and will 
be referred to as NEA in the text, regardless of the date under discussion . 
.. Statute of ENEA, 53 Am. J. Int. L. 1012, Arts. l(b), 5(a), l1(a)(i) (1957). 
57 ENEA 13TH ACTIVITY REPORT 39-41 (1971). 
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perts which determined that the plan was feasible and not unduly 
hazardous. Detailed planning and direction was then assigned to an 
Operations Executive Group comprised of representatives of the 
participating countries and other interested parties. The individual 
nations were left to arrange the transport of their own waste to a 
designated port where the international phase would begin with 
loading of the waste onto an NEA commissioned ship. Thus all 
questions of local regulation and security were left to the local gov-
ernment. In addition, the national government also was given the 
responsibility of ensuring that the waste containers met the stan-
dards of the entire operation, a matter of more general concern. 58 
The international phase began with the arrival of the wastes at 
the port of loading. The NEA ship, supervised by NEA-appointed 
Escorting Officers, arrived at the various ports in a schedule coordi-
nated with the national phase to provide for minimal port storage 
time. The loading, the dumping operation itself, and ultimately the 
decommissioning of the ship were all handled through the NEA.59 
Costs such as loading costs which could be attributed to a single 
country were assessed to that country, the remaining expenses were 
shared in proportion to the tonnage of waste supplied by each coun-
try.80 
In these disposal operations, at the least, a very thorough risk 
assessment was carried out,81 an advantage of a multi-national oper-
ation. If parochial considerations are to predominate they will at 
least be on a somewhat broader scale. A better solution would be to 
carry out such planning on a worldwide level, especially in connec-
tion with the ocean dumping of radioactive wastes which is itself 
controversial. The Soviet Union, for example, has taken the position 
that international agreements prohibit the disposal of wastes of any 
degree of radioactivity into the ocean.82 Of additional benefit is the 
development of an experienced corps of managers and technicians 
under an international authority, necessary if international opera-
tions are to continue. 
Euratom is established along the same lines as the European 
Common Market and the European Coal and Steel Community.63 
.8 RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL OPERATION INTO THE ATLANTIC 1967 at 25. (ENEA 1968). 
51 Id. at 33. 
10 Id. at 53. 
" Brown, International Law and Marine Pollution: Radioactive Waste and "Other Hazard-
ous Substances", 11 NAT. RES. J. 221, 233 (1971). 
12 Goldie, supra note 30, at 55 . 
.. Glaesner, The European Atomic Energy Community, in IAEA TRAINING COURSE, supra 
note 23, at 39, 40. 
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It has power to establish standards with which the Member States 
must comply through their own legislation.64 Each Member State 
must set up permanent facilities to control the level of radioactivity 
in nuclear installations, with access available to the Commission65 
and reports regularly required. 66 Data on disposal operations must 
be reported with sufficient detail to "enable the Commission to 
determine whether the implementation of such plan is likely to 
involve radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of 
another Member State."67 Finally, the Commission may issue direc-
tives requiring the State to take "measures necessary to prevent the 
basic standards from being exceeded and to ensure observance of 
any applicable provisions."68 Unfortunately, despite this broad au-
thority, implementation of health and safety regulations in national 
legislation in accordance with Euratom standards has been spotty.8D 
Competition also arose, with France particularly expanding its own 
program at the expense of the joint effort.70 This result was particu-
larly unfortunate since one of the perceived advantages of the Com-
munity was that safety considerations, especially the protection of 
workers, would not be affected by competition within the Com-
munity.71 
Apparently concern over safeguards has overshadowed safety 
problems, and once again implementing safety protections was left 
in the hands of the operator state. For example, safeguard regula-
tion in Euratom is under the direct supervision of the central au-
thority, and thus operates independently of that of the Member 
States, whereas health and safety regulations operate only as direc-
tives to the States.72 Even though mandatory, the ultimate effec-
tiveness of the latter regulations turns on the State's individual 
responsibility in carrying them out. 
C. International Agreements and Declarations 
International agreements and declarations on the environment 
.. Euratom Treaty, 298 UNTS 167, Art. 30, 33 (1958) . 
.. Id. Art. 35 . 
•• Id. Art. 36. 
" Id. Art. 37. 
'R Id. Art. 38. 
II Dickstein, National Environmental Hazards and International Law, 23 INT. AND COMPo 
L. Q., 426, 444 (1971). 
7. Smith, The European Atomic Energy Community; The Limits of Supra-nationalism, 1 
CAL. WESTERN INT. L. J. 33, 44 (1970). 
71 Glaesner, supra note 63, at 41-42. 
7. Id. at 41. 
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have been proliferating with the same rapidity that environmental 
concerns have spread intranationally. Especially in the field of the 
law of the sea, "this recent proliferation of international Conven-
tions ... has resulted in a passage from [a] relative legal vacuum 
... to a situation which could be qualified as excessive."73 Insofar 
as radiation pollution has been considered, it has been recognized 
that specialized agencies exist which are already attempting to deal 
with the problem. As early as 1958 the parties to the Convention on 
the High Seas,74 nearly all the nuclear energy states, agreed to take 
measures to prevent pollution of the seas by the dumping ofradioac-
tive waste, considering the standards and regulations promulgated 
by international organizations, and to "co-operate with the compe-
tent international organizations in taking measures for the preven-
tion of pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any 
activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents."75 
Contemporaneous with this Convention, a resolution appointed the 
IAEA to promulgate regulations and prepare standards for the pro-
tection of the marine environment.76 In 1959 the IAEA issued the 
Brynnielsson Report,77 which discussed recommendations on ocean 
waste disposal. A subsequent panel issued comprehensive regula-
tions of which radioactive wastes could be disposed of at sea, and 
the procedures that should be followed. The authority of these rec-
ommendations was somewhat diluted by a strong dissent, led by the 
Soviet expert on the panel, who argued that the Convention prohib-
ited any deposit of radioactive waste in the ocean.78 
More recently, under the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes 
at Sea (London Convention),19 with 80 countries participating as 
well as representatives from several international agencies, the 
States party pledged themselves "to promote, within the competent 
specialized agencies and other international bodies, measures to 
protect the marine environment against pollution caused by . . . 
radioactive pollutants from all sources."80 The IAEA has been spe-
cifically designated as the international body in the field of radioac-
73 Note on International Conventions Relating to Radioactive Marine Pollution, 13 
NUCLEAR LAW BULL. 39, 54 (1974). 
" 13 UST 2312, TIAS 5200, 450 UNTS 82 (1958). 
" Id. Art. 25. 
" UN DOC. NCONF. 13/1.56 (1958). 
17 RADIOACfIVE WASTE DISPOSAL INTO THE SEA, IAEA SAFETY SERIES No.5, (1961). 
" SZASZ, supra note 36, at 715-16. 
79 11 Int. L. M. 1291 (1972). 
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tive waste81 and has begun promulgating recommendations under 
that authorization. 82 
The United Nations Action Plan for the Human Environment,83 
promulgated as a result of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment held at Stockholm in 1972, via Recommen-
dation 75, the only recommendation concerned with radioactivity 
on a list of 109, contains more specific recommendations for interna-
tional action. First, governments are to explore with IAEA and the 
World Health Organization the developing of a registry of signifi-
cant releases of radioactive materials. Also, the governments are to 
support and expand international cooperation on waste problems, 
working with the IAEA and other organizations, "including co-
ordination of plans for the siting of fuel re-processing plants in rela-
tion to the siting of the ultimate storage area." Implementation of 
this second recommendation would place the most significant por-
tion of the waste problem under international control. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Clearly, States making use of nuclear power can only benefit from 
a centralized radioactive waste management authority providing a 
greater assurance of nuclear safety. Radioactive wastes are "prob-
ably the most hazardous material on earth"84 and an imperative 
need exists for near fail-safe certainty that harmful amounts will 
not be discharged into the environment. Even with good faith at-
tempts on the part of nuclear States to dispose of wastes safely, a 
wide disparity exists in the actions of the various States. Wastes 
classified high-level in one are classified intermediate-level in an-
other, and practices unacceptable in one are satisfactory in an-
other.K5 If "[i]nternational nuclear waste management resembles a 
modern day Tower of Babel,"86 then it follows that some nation's 
procedures do not meet international standards. 
The ability to rely on a competent international agency to handle 
the problem of radioactive waste, one of the major problems pre-
sented by nuclear power, may help decrease the opposition to nu-
., Id. Annex 1(6) . 
.. Programme, supra note 51, at j. 18. 
M3 REPORT OF THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, Stockholm, June 5-16, 
1972, at 7 (1973). 
o. Dreschoff, Saunders and Zeller, International High Level Nuclear Waste Management, 
30 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCI. 33 (Jan. 19740 . 
.. Id. at 29 . 
• , Id. at 33. 
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clear reactors. For example, in the United States, a strong factor in 
the fears over nuclear expansion has been a mistrust of the ability 
of the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the risksY If a com-
petent international organization assumes the function of caretaker 
of radioactive wastes, it may serve to assuage some of the doubts of 
nuclear energy's opponents. 
In view of the current high degree of world disharmony, the lack 
of sustained effort to provide for radioactive waste disposal through 
an international agency is not surprising. Considering all the cir-
cumstances, however, little is standing in the way of such an organi-
zation. That this is an area where political controversy is at a mini-
mum88 was early recognized, and political issues should not cause 
significant interference. Perhaps a problem is that when radioactive 
materials are at issue, concern over nuclear weapons, and thus na-
tional defense and security, immediately arises. The multi-lateral 
atomic energy organizations all have safeguards as a major concern: 
protecting against the diversion of nuclear materials to military 
purposes. Unlike safety regulations, safeguards, by definition, can 
not be left in the hands of the individual operator. Thus an agency 
with limited resources will concentrate on safeguards. The only seri-
ous multi-lateral waste disposal operation was carried out by the 
NEA, an organization whose safeguards functions are very limited. 
An additional problem of the apparent closeness of safeguards 
and safety regulation is the possible sensitivity of an operator State 
that safety operations carried out by an outside agency may intrude 
on its plans for nuclear weapon acquisition or accumulation. But it 
should certainly be possible, as a basis for immediate action, to 
separate at least some of the waste disposal operation from any 
strategically sensitive activity. Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, then head of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, in an address to the 18th session of the 
general conference of the IAEA, said: 
If each country that moves into nuclear-generated electricity is faced 
with the necessity to develop its own means of handling the spent fuel, 
then each country will have to develop the technology for this purpose. 
As an alternative, the establishment of internationally approved facili-
ties to handle all the spent fuel arising from power reactors may be 
helpful to participating countries. It may also be reassuring to the rest 
of the world.89 
81 ABRAHAMSON, ENVIRONMENTAL COST OF ELECTRIC POWER, 14 (Scientist's Institute for Pub-
lic Information 1970); EHRLICH, supra note 3, at 53-54 . 
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While this remark is precisely applicable to the problem of high-
level radioactive wastes arising at fuel reprocessing plants, it was 
uttered in the context of weapons development and thus illustrates 
the problems in separating the two areas. Effective high-level waste 
management would best begin at the fuel re-processing plant, but 
this plant is also the source of enriched plutonium usable in nuclear 
weapons. 90 It would be unfortunate if national security unnecessar-
ily prevented international control of wastes beginning at the time 
of re-processing. Aside from the safety factors, an IAEA "cursory" 
study has shown that regional, as opposed to individual, re-
processing plants, taking into account all the expenses of waste 
management, would be some 50% cheaper.9) 
The nuclear exporter countries are in an obvious position to assign 
waste management operations to an international body; however 
they have taken few steps in this regard. The United States Atomic 
Energy Commission, for example, when supplying atomic materials 
to foreign nations, must do so pursuant to an agreement for coopera-
tion to which such nation is a party.92 As of January 1975, the United 
States had in force such agreements for cooperation with 28 coun-
tries.93 These agreements provide that the United States has the 
right to consult with the foreign government in the matter of health 
and safety. 94 United States policy is to, wherever possible, transfer 
its authority under bi-lateral agreements to the IAEA.95 The United 
States also recognized that the IAEA was the most effective avenue 
for the promulgation of waste management standards, and that 
"[t]here must be a positive assignment of these functions, and the 
capability to discharge them effectively must be built on a program 
of actual participation in a wide range of activities related to atomic 
energy."96 Transfers of safeguard authority to the IAEA,97 but no 
equivalent transfer of safety functions, have occurred. Once again, 
safeguards have overshadowed safety, and the nuclear operator has 
been relied on to enforce its own safety standards. 
The IAEA does anticipate that in the future its major efforts will 
DO Commoner, A Reporter at Large, Energy-II, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 1976, at 40. 
" Lenneman, supra note 6, at 11. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 2074 (1964). 
93 Treaties in Force, Jan. 1, 1975. 
" E.g., Treaty with Brazil on Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, 23 UST 2477, 
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95 POLICY REPORT, supra note 88, at 2 . 
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shift to those significant safety and waste management problems 
which are becoming more serious with the growth of power installa-
tions,98 and has noted particular concern over the management of 
the release of radioactive elements which may cross national bound-
aries and the storage or disposal of high-level wastes. 99 In this latter 
area, the IAEA has already held a panel meeting to discuss the 
establishment of international sites. lOo In the limited area of waste 
depositaries, at least, no strategic implications are present. An in-
ternational depositary will still face the same technical problems 
that national governments are encountering, but full co-operation 
should enable these problems to be overcome more quickly. Even 
cost should not prove a significant obstacle. Waste depositaries 
serving a large area may well be cheaper than the aggregate cost of 
scattered local depositaries. A reasonable basis for the allocation of 
expenses, perhaps the quantity of waste produced, should not be 
difficult to establish. Considering the scope of the risk, the govern-
ments of the world would be short-changing their citizens by being 
niggardly with an organization charged with such a serious responsi-
bility; any expenses in keeping high-level waste away from the bios-
phere are easily justified. 
Establishing international depositaries for high-level waste, while 
politically the easiest step forward in the world's response to the 
dangers of nuclear energy, is far from a final solution, and may not 
even be adequate to alleviate concern over reactor construction. It 
would certainly be far better if international responsibility could 
begin one step earlier in the fuel cycle, at the re-processing of spent 
fuel. The welcome effect of slowing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would result; the environmental advantage would be an 
extra benefit. 
At an even earlier stage in the fuel cycle, essentially the entire 
waste problem could be put under international control by allowing 
a competent international organization to take full responsibility for 
specific low level waste disposal activity at individual nuclear en-
ergy plants. Any discharge of radioactive waste would be under the 
immediate supervision of employees of the international agency 
which could prescribe particular measures that must be taken. The 
costs for these prophylactic controls could be assumed by the inter-
national agency, which would have a budget taken from the funds 
" Programme, supra note 51, j.3 . 
.. Id. at j.17. 
100 Id. at j.15. 
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States are now spending individually on their own waste 
management programs. 
Measures to protect against radioactive waste cannot be imposed 
on nuclear power States from outside. Even if an organization like 
the IAEA was prepared to take the step of mandating safety con-
trols, no world authority is capable of enforcing its orders. Any steps 
that are taken will have to be voluntarily accepted by each State, 
recognizing that full cooperation with an international authority is 
to its own benefit. No reason exists why, in the limited areas of 
radioactive waste management, political differences can not be put 
aside so that the planet can be relieved of the risk of environmental 
disaster. The activity involved is well delineated; no encroachment 
on critical national interests should result; the problem transcends 
national boundaries. Nations producing radioactive waste have a 
grave responsibility to see that it be handled with intelligence and 
maturity. Internationalism in the abstract has been a well respected 
ideal; in practice it has not kept the nations of the world from 
teetering on the brink of cataclysmic war for over two decades. If 
the public expressions by national leaders about international good-
will have been made in good faith, these leaders should welcome the 
opportunity to join together in mutual assistance in an area where 
no risk of compromising vital national interests is present, where so 
much is at stake, and where international cooperation is so essen-
tial. 
The basic political framework has already been developed. If the 
IAEA is unacceptable because of its involvement with safeguards, 
the establishment of a new agency with more limited functions 
should be simple, making use of the IAEA's experience and accumu-
lated resources. The scientists, engineers and technicians from the 
various nations who will need to work together to implement an 
international radioactive waste disposal agency have long been ex-
tensively sharing their research and information. An agency capable 
of assuming the responsibility needs only the authorization to come 
full-blown into existence. 
A crisis situation of resources and energy exists on this planet. 
Nuclear energy may be part of the solution to this crisis; one severe 
misstep and it may itself prove the final crisis. All nations must do 
all they can to prevent such a misstep. The voluntary cession of a 
non-vital portion of their national sovereignty is a small price to pay 
for the future security of the Earth. 
